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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 At issue on this appeal is whether supervised release 
may be revoked and an offender sent to prison based upon a 
District Court’s finding that the offender acted in bad faith in 
relation to his obligation to make restitution to the victims of 
his criminal conduct.  In this case, although Appellant David 
Bagdy complied with the letter of the District Court’s 
restitution order by ultimately paying more than one-third of a 
$435,000 inheritance he had received while on supervised 
release, he engaged in a lavish spending spree that dissipated 
the balance of the inheritance while delaying the proceedings 
intended to modify the restitution order.  Like the District 
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Court, we find Bagdy’s conduct reprehensible.  We conclude, 
however, that the District Court could not revoke supervised 
release for such bad faith conduct because Bagdy did not 
violate a specific condition of supervised release in relation to 
the restitution obligation.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
judgment and remand for further proceedings.1   
I. 
 Bagdy pled guilty to a charge of wire fraud arising 
from a scheme to embezzle hundreds of thousands of dollars 
from a small family-owned lumber business for which he 
served as a consultant.  The District Court sentenced him to 
36 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised 
release.  The District Court also ordered that Bagdy make  
restitution in the amount of $566,115.57.  As a condition of 
supervised release, the District Court ordered that Bagdy 
“make periodic payments of at least ten percent of his gross 
monthly income toward any outstanding balance of 
restitution.  Payments shall be made in such amounts and at 
such times as directed by his probation officer and approved 
by the Court.”  App. 32-33.  Furthermore, Bagdy was 
required to “provide his probation officer with access to any 
requested financial information” to enable the probation 
                                              
1 Bagdy may have violated other conditions of supervised 
release.  For example, he may have violated a condition that 
required him to make certain reports to his probation officer 
on financial matters.  On remand, the District Court is free to 
consider whether Bagdy violated a specific condition of 
supervision, and, if so, what the appropriate sanction for that 
violation should be. 
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office to determine an appropriate payment schedule.  App. 
33.    
 Bagdy completed his prison term and commenced 
supervised release in July of 2011.  In March of 2012, Bagdy 
reported to his probation officer that he had received 
$409,799.13 in inheritance from his aunt.  Bagdy consulted 
with his probation officer regarding his restitution obligation 
in regards to the inheritance and paid $41,000 of the total 
toward restitution.  Bagdy maintains that this contribution 
reflected the ten percent of his gross monthly income that he 
believed the District Court’s judgment obligated him to put 
toward restitution.  
 On April 9, 2012, the government filed a motion to 
modify the order of restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k).2  
                                              
2 Section 3664(k) instructs that: 
A restitution order shall provide 
that the defendant shall notify the 
court and the Attorney General of 
any material change in the 
defendant's economic 
circumstances that might affect 
the defendant's ability to pay 
restitution. The court may also 
accept notification of a material 
change in the defendant's 
economic circumstances from the 
United States or from the victim. 
The Attorney General shall certify 
to the court that the victim or 
victims owed restitution by the 
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Shortly after filing the motion, the government met with 
Bagdy and his counsel in an attempt to reach a settlement as 
to the amount of his inheritance Bagdy would put toward 
restitution.  Although no formal agreement was reached at the 
meeting, Bagdy contributed an additional $60,000 of his 
inheritance toward restitution and remained in 
communication with the government regarding a possible 
settlement.   
While negotiations between the government and 
Bagdy continued, Bagdy requested several extensions of time 
to file a response to the government’s § 3664(k) motion, 
representing to the District Court that he was engaged in 
“good faith negotiations to resolve all restitution issues by 
agreement” with the government.  Government’s Supp. App. 
9.  For months, the government did not oppose Bagdy’s 
extension motions and the District Court granted five of them.  
When no settlement had been reached as of early November 
2012, the government emailed Bagdy’s counsel to express its 
concern that Bagdy may be stalling the hearing while 
depleting his inheritance.   
                                                                                                     
defendant have been notified of 
the change in circumstances. 
Upon receipt of the notification, 
the court may, on its own motion, 
or the motion of any party, 
including the victim, adjust the 
payment schedule, or require 
immediate payment in full, as the 
interests of justice require.  
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 The District Court finally held the § 3664(k) hearing 
on December 3, 2012.  At the hearing, the government 
informed the District Court that Bagdy had inherited from his 
aunt an additional $25,000 that it had previously been 
unaware of, bringing his total inheritance to $434,799.13.  
The government also told the court that it had just learned that 
Bagdy had spent all but about $52,000 of the inheritance.  
The government requested to have Bagdy’s conditions of 
supervised release modified to order payment of the $52,000 
balance of his inheritance.  Bagdy’s counsel did not object 
and the District Court granted the motion.3   
 The government candidly acknowledged that it did not 
know if Bagdy had violated any condition of supervised 
release by depleting his inheritance.  The District Court 
instructed the government to “[c]onsult with the probation 
department and do your research and look for precedent and 
see if potentially if the bad faith on the part of the Defendant 
under all of these circumstances somehow constitutes a 
constructive breach of the conditions [of supervised release].”  
App. 58.  
 On February 6, 2013, the government filed a motion 
requesting that the District Court hold a hearing regarding 
Bagdy’s alleged violation of his supervised release.  The 
motion noted that “since receiving a total of $434,000 last 
year from an inheritance, the defendant has paid $152,048.48 
toward restitution, and has spent the remaining $281,952.”  
                                              
3 Thus, approximately $153,000 from an inheritance of nearly 
$435,000 was applied against the restitution obligation of 
more than $565,000.   
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App. 69.  The government’s motion detailed Bagdy’s 
expenditures during this period, as reported to the probation 
office, but also alleged that copies of Bagdy’s bank records 
reflected additional expenditures that had not been reported to 
the probation office.  Unreported expenditures included 
$41,000 in ATM withdrawals, $21,800 in Western Union 
transfers, and $5,800 in purchases from a business named 
Fragile Paradise Florist.  The government argued that 
Bagdy’s failure to put a greater amount of his inheritance 
toward restitution while making extravagant personal 
expenditures constituted a willful violation of the conditions 
of supervised release.  
 At the June 4, 2013 hearing on the motion, the 
government maintained that Bagdy’s conditions of supervised 
release required him to pay the full amount of restitution and 
that “[t]he requirement that he pay not less than 10 percent is 
merely setting a floor during the term of his supervised 
release that he has to satisfy.”  App. 117.  Bagdy’s counsel 
responded by contending that “a specific violation of a 
condition of this Court’s judgment has not been adequately 
alleged” because nothing in the restitution order had indicated 
that Bagdy could be found in violation for not making 
payments in good faith.  App. 115.   
 The District Court concluded: 
Mr. Bagdy, I have to agree with 
the Government, I think that your 
conduct in this case, you knew 
you owed this money, and to have 
inherited this large sum and to 
spend it the way you did was not 
acting in good faith and it does 
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constitute a violation of my 
restitution order.  So I do find that 
you violated the condition and I 
am going to sentence you to six 
months incarceration. 
App. 120.  This appeal followed.4 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3583(e)(3) and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
“The District Court’s decision to revoke supervised release is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  However, the factual 
findings supporting that decision are reviewed for clear error; 
legal issues are subject to de novo review.”  United States v. 
Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations 
omitted).   
A. 
 A District Court may revoke a defendant’s supervised 
release and impose a term of imprisonment “if the court, 
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
applicable to revocation of . . . supervised release, finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a 
condition of supervised release . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  
The issue presented here is whether Bagdy violated a specific 
condition of supervised release by remitting only $152,048.84 
from his inheritance.   
                                              
4 The District Court agreed to allow Bagdy to continue under 
supervision pending this appeal. 
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 We have repeatedly expressed concern that conditions 
of supervised release be sufficiently clear to enable 
individuals on supervised release to freely choose between 
compliance and violation.  In this regard, our precedents 
require that conditions of supervised release provide a 
defendant with “adequate notice of what he may and may not 
do . . . .” United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Similarly, we have held that conditions of supervised 
release “must provide specific standards which avoid 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  Maloney, 513 
F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Tolchin v. Supreme 
Court of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 1115 (3d Cir. 1997)).    
 At the revocation hearing, the District Court did not 
identify an explicit condition of supervised release that Bagdy 
had violated.5  The District Court took issue with Bagdy’s 
depletion of his inheritance on personal expenses, finding that 
the dissipation of assets constituted bad faith in light of 
Bagdy’s obligation to make complete restitution to his 
victims.  Bagdy, however, had informed his probation officer 
and consulted the officer before making his initial payment of 
                                              
5 The District Court’s written order found that Bagdy’s 
conduct had violated the condition of supervised release 
“directing that the defendant make periodic payments of at 
least ten (10%) percent of his gross monthly income toward 
the outstanding balance of restitution.”  App. 1.  The 
revocation hearing transcript makes clear that the District 
Court believed Bagdy’s depletion of his assets violated a duty 
of good faith implied by that condition, rather than the 
explicit terms of the condition itself.  It is undisputed that 
Bagdy paid more than 10% of his inheritance toward 
restitution. 
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$41,000.  Regarding payment, the judgment setting forth the 
conditions of supervised release provided that “[t]he 
defendant shall make periodic payments of at least ten (10%) 
percent of his gross monthly income toward the outstanding 
balance of restitution.  Payments shall be made in such 
amounts and at such times as directed by his probation officer 
and approved by the court.”  App. 40.  There is nothing to 
suggest that Bagdy failed to make payment as directed by his 
probation officer.  Bagdy’s failure to preserve a greater 
portion of his inheritance for satisfaction of the restitution 
order was not, on its own, a violation of the conditions of 
supervised release.6   
 The District Court found Bagdy in violation of 
supervised release for behavior that was not prohibited by an 
express condition of the judgment setting forth his conditions 
of supervised release.  The question then is whether 
supervised release may be revoked where a defendant’s 
conduct supports a finding that he did not act in good faith in 
discharging his obligation to make restitution in full.     
                                              
6 The government argues that, by not disclosing numerous 
personal expenditures he made that exceeded $500, Bagdy 
violated a condition of supervised release that required him to 
“report to the probation officer as directed by the court or 
probation officer and . . . submit a truthful and complete 
written report within the first five days of each month.”  App. 
41.  Although the record appears to support the government’s 
claim that Bagdy was not forthcoming with probation 
regarding his expenditures, the District Court did not find him 
in violation of this condition at his revocation hearing.    The 
District Court should consider on remand whether Bagdy can 
be found in violation of this condition of supervised release. 
11 
 
B. 
 The government argues that, although no good faith 
term appeared in Bagdy’s conditions of supervised release, 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660 (1983), authorizes a District Court to revoke 
supervised release when an offender fails to act in good faith 
with respect to paying restitution.  Bearden addressed a 
situation in which an indigent defendant had failed to make 
the minimum payments required by the express terms of the 
conditions of his probation.  The trial court had ordered the 
defendant “to pay $100 that day, $100 the next day, and the 
$550 balance within four months.”  Id. at 662.  When the 
defendant was incapable of obtaining work that would allow 
him to pay restitution on that schedule, the trial court revoked 
his probation and sentenced him “to serve the remaining 
portion of the probationary period in prison.”  Id. at 663.   
 The Supreme Court held that the trial court was 
required to conduct an inquiry into the indigent defendant’s 
ability to pay before revoking his probation and could not 
“automatically turn[] a fine into a prison sentence” for an 
indigent defendant who had failed to adhere to his payment 
schedule.  Id. at 674.  While holding that a trial court may not 
revoke probation “[i]f the probationer could not pay despite 
sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so,” 
the Court also observed that the trial court could revoke 
probation “[i]f the probationer willfully refused to pay or 
failed to make sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire 
the resources to pay.”  Id. at 672.  The government seizes 
upon the Court’s reference to the offender’s “bona fide 
efforts” to make restitution as imposing an implied duty of 
good faith.  What the government’s argument ignores, 
however, is that there was a violation of the terms of 
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supervision in Bearden: the offender had not made payments 
according to the court-imposed payment schedule.  The 
offender’s bona fide efforts were relevant to whether the 
offender could be sent to prison for having failed to make the 
requisite payments.  Thus, the good faith inquiry mandated by 
Bearden comes into play when nonpayment of a monetary 
sanction is in fact a violation of the conditions of probation or 
supervised release.  Unlike Bearden, Bagdy’s failure to pay 
more than $152,000 of his inheritance towards restitution did 
not violate an explicit condition of supervision.  And the 
conditions of Bagdy’s supervised release did not require that 
he make good faith efforts to pay his restitution.  
C. 
 The government also directs our attention to the 
informal agreement that it reached with Bagdy in early 2012, 
which provided that Bagdy would not deplete his inheritance 
prior to reaching a settlement with the government.  Even if 
Bagdy’s conduct breached such an agreement, honoring that 
agreement was not a condition of supervised release.     
 To avoid the occurrence of a similar situation in the 
future, District Courts may wish to consider adding a term to 
conditions of supervised release that would provide for 
contingencies where a defendant with a restitution obligation 
comes upon an unforeseen inheritance or windfall.  Such a 
term might prohibit defendants from spending a certain 
percentage of contested funds during the pendency of a § 
3664(k) motion.  In the absence of any such term in this case, 
we cannot affirm the District Court’s decision to revoke 
Bagdy’s supervised release for actions that were not in 
violation of his conditions of supervised release.   
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment, and remand for additional proceedings.  
Although the record suggests that Bagdy’s conduct may have 
violated other conditions of supervised release, we will leave 
that determination for the District Court on remand. 
